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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the requirements of quantum meruit have been 
satisfied. 
2. Whether the plaintiff is precluded from quantum 
meruit recovery because of his contract with a party other 
than the defendant. 
3. Whether the facts and equities of this case require 
that the lower court's judgment be upheld. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(References [R at ] are to the Agreed Statement of 
the record on Appeal) 
Defendant, doing business as Post Petroleum Company, 
owned a 33.75% working interest in an oil well located in 
Uintah County, Utah. [R at 1]. The oil well was operated by 
a corporation, Post Petroleum Company, Inc. (sometimes referred 
to as "corporation11 below). [R at 2], Plaintiff entered into 
an oral contract with the corporation, completing the agreed 
services in a reasonable time and manner. [R at 2]. The 
parties agree that $18,437.13 is the reasonable value of the 
services and materials furnished by the plaintiff pursuant to 
the contract. [R at 2]. Upon completion of plaintiff's services, 
he billed the corporation for the entire amount, as instructed 
by the corporation. Although both the defendant and the 
corporation knew that plaintiff had billed the wrong party, 
neither ever informed the plaintiff of this fact. [R at 2]. 
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When payment was not received, plaintiff filed a 
mechanic's lien against the interest of the corporation in 
the well. [R at 3]. The corporation, without making any 
payments to plaintiff, later filed bankruptcy in Oklahoma. 
It was not until plaintiff received the bankruptcy pleadings 
that he learned of the defendant's ownership interest in the 
oil well. [R at 3]. Plaintiff filed a claim in the bankruptcy 
proceeding, but later amended that claim to discount the amount 
of recovery in the present matter. [R at 3]. 
The present matter was submitted to the Seventh Judicial 
District Court on stipulated facts essentially the same as 
those in the Agreed Statement of Record on Appeal. Judge 
Davidson found that the elements of quantum meruit had been 
satisfied, that the relationship between the defendant and the 
corporation unjustly confused plaintiff as to the proper party 
from which to seek payment, and that the defendant was the 
ultimate beneficiary of the contract between the plaintiff 
and the corporation. [R at 4]. Based on those findings, the 
judge partially granted plaintiff's prayer for relief, 
reducing the amount due under the contract by the 66.257o 
interest in the well owned by non-parties, together with 
costs of court and interest at the rate of 12% from June 17, 
1982. [R at 4]. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff in the lower court successfully demonstrated 
that the requirements for quantum meruit recovery have been 
satisfied. Defendant has acquired and retained a benefit, 
at the expense of the plaintiff, which, under the circumstances, 
require the imposition of an implied-in-law contract to protect 
the interests of the plaintiff. Although Utah case law exists 
which facially seem to support the defendant's position, those 
cases are distinguishable herein. The knowledge and silence 
of the defendant, the relationship between the defendant and 
the corporation, and the inability of the plaintiff to recover 
the full value of his services from the corporation will work 
injustice on the plaintiff if quantum meruit recovery is not 
allowed. The lower court's judgment should therefore be 
affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFF HAS SATISFIED THE ELEMENTS OF QUANTUM MERUIT 
This Court recently reiterated the elements of quantum 
meruit recovery in Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 
(Utah, 1984), stating: 
"Unjust enrichment occurs whenever a person has 
and retains money or benefits that in justice 
and equity belong to another. Thus, in order 
for a claim based on unjust enrichment to be 
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successful, there must be (1) a benefit 
conferred on one person by another; (2) 
an appreciation or knowledge by the conferee 
of the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or 
retention by the conferee of the benefit 
under such circumstances as to make it 
inequitable for the conferee to retain 
the benefit without payment of its value." • 
It has been stipulated in the present matter, that the 
value of plaintiff's services to the well property is and was 
$18,473.13- Again by stipulation, it has been determined 
that the defendant is the owner of a 33.757o working interest 
in the well. The benefit to the property is therefore, to 
the extent of defendant's ownership, a benefit to the 
defendant. The first element of quantum meruit recovery has 
been fulfilled, and is not challenged by defendant in this 
appeal. 
As for the second element, in General Leasing Company v. 
Manivest Corporation, 667 P.2d 596, 598 (Utah, 1983), this 
court stated that "where the property owner has requested the 
installation or services or has acquiesced in their benefits11 
the trier of fact can appropriately find an implied contract 
to pay for those benefits. Here, the defendant contracted 
with Post Petroleum Company, Inc., to operate the well in 
question, knowing full well that successful operation would 
require that certain improvements (such as those provided 
by the plaintiff) be made. The contract with Post Petroleum 
Company, Inc., therefore constitutes a "request11 for improve-
ments under the language of General Leasing. Moreover, there 
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is no dispute that the defendant had knowledge of the 
improvements, both at the time of the contract and during 
the construction period. His failure to object to them 
constitutes "acquiescence11 in their bestowal. This element 
of quantum meruit is also satisfied, and again, is not 
challenged by defendant in this appeal. 
Finally, recovery under quantum meruit requires a 
showing that the benefit has been accepted or retained 
"under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the 
conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value.11 
Berrett, supra. In the present matter, defendant Post knew 
that plaintiff had sought payment from Post Petroleum 
Company, Inc., that plaintiff had filed a mechanicfs lien 
against the corporation, and that the corporation had filed 
bankruptcy in Oklahoma. Despite this knowledge, neither 
defendant nor the corporation ever informed plaintiff that 
it was the defendant' s dba and not the corporation that 
actually owned the property and received the benefits of 
the plaintiff's labor. Plaintiff's ability to collect from 
the corporation having now been impaired, it would be unjust 
for the defendant to retain the value of plaintiff's 
services. Under a less inequitable set of facts, it may 
well be that plaintiff would not be entitled to a quantum 
meruit recovery. But, as found by Judge Davidson in his 
Ruling below, the fact that defendant was the ultimate 
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beneficiary of the 
between defendant 
unjust enrichment 
plaintiff. 
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aercial Fixtures the lease 
landowner specifically provided 
its were to be paid by the lessee, 
leral rule, a tenant's creditors 
irge the land with the value of 
improvements or repairs than the tenant would have,11 noting 
that in Commercial Fixtures, the tenant had contracted all 
such rights away. 564 P.2d at 774. There has been no 
similar relinquishment of rights in the instant case. 
Moreover, in Commercial Fixtures, the plaintiff made 
no attempt to exhaust any of his available legal remedies, 
and did not show any sufficient excuse for his inaction 
against the lessee. To the contrary, plaintiff in this case 
filed a mechanic's lien which, due to Post Petroleum 
Corporation Inc.'s bankruptcy proceedings, has become at 
least partially impaired. Plaintiff submits that the 
intervening bankruptcy constitutes a sufficient excuse for 
disregarding his legal remedies pending recovery against 
defendant in this matter. 
Finally, in Commercial Fixtures, this Court stated: 
The mere fact that a third person benefits 
from a contract between two others does not 
make such third person liable in quasi-
contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution. 
[Citation omitted]. There must be some mis-
leading act, request for services, or the 
like, to support such an action. Mere 
failure of performance by one of tEe 
contracting parties does not give rise to 
a right of restitution. Emphasis added. 
564 P2.d at 774. 
In the present matter, there exists much more than mere 
failure of performance. There were "misleading acts11--the 
silence of both defendant and the corporation as to who 
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would ultimately be responsible for payment. There was a 
"request for services11—defendant !s contract with the 
corporation to operate the well, knowing that improvements 
would have to be made. And there was an obvious "or the 
like" circumstances—the related ownership interests of the 
benefitted property and the businesses. On the facts of 
this case, the rule laid down in Commercial Fixtures must 
bend to the exception expressly provided for in that opinion. 
Plaintiff submits that the facts of this appeal more 
closely resemble those in Paschall's Inc. v. Dozier, 407 
S.W.2d 150 (Tenn., 1966), than the facts of Commercial 
Fixtures. In Paschall1s, the plaintiff had furnished 
materials to the residence of the defendant pursuant to the 
request of the defendant's daughter. Plaintiff then 
attempted to collect from the daughter, but the daughter 
filed bankruptcy. The plaintiff then brought suit against 
the owner on a quantum meruit theory. The Supreme Court 
of Tennessee, holding that the plaintiff could recover, 
stated: 
Aside from unjust enrichment...it is 
generally accepted that, other than the 
statutory right to a mechanic's lien or 
other special statutory remedies, sub-
contractors and materialmen have no right 
to a personal judgment against the owner 
where there is no contractual relation 
between them. Emphasis in original. 
The defendants assert that an implied under-
taking cannot arise against one benefited by 
the work performed, where the work is done 
under a special contract with another. While 
this may be the general rule, we do not think 
that it is applicable in every case. Indisput-
ably, where one is afforded recovery from the 
person with whom he has a contract, he cannot 
also recover from third persons incidentally 
benefited by his performance. In such a case 
it could hardly be said that the retention of 
the benefit by the third party is unjust as 
to the furnisher. However, the situation is 
dissimilar where a person furnishes materials 
and labor under a contract for the benefit 
of a third party, and that contract becomes 
unenforceable or invalid. In that situation 
there is certainly no reason to preclude the 
furnisher or subcontractor from seeking 
recovery against the third person on the 
theory of quantum meruit. 
407 S.W.2d 153, 154. 
Although the Paschall1s opinion's only recognition to 
date by this Court has been in Justice Maughanfs dissenting 
opinion in Commercial Fixtures, plaintiff submits that 
under the facts of the present matter Paschall1s is directly 
in point, and urges the Court to adopt its reasoning here. 
III. 
THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW REQUIRES 
THAT THE LOWER COURT BE UPHELD 
A recovery for services in quantum meruit is equitable 
in nature. Christensen v. Abbott, 671 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah, 
1983). This Court may therefore review both legal and 
factual questions, but because of the advantaged position of 
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the trial court, "considerable deference11 is given to the 
trial court's findings and judgment. Christensen, supra; 
Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah, 1984). It has 
even been stated that in equity cases, the findings and 
judgment of the trial court are entitled to a "presumption 
of correctness11 and will not be upset unless the evidence 
"clearly preponderates against them." Ovard v. Cannon, 600 
P.2d 1246 (Utah, 1979). Plaintiff respectfully submits that 
the evidence in the present matter does not preponderate 
against the written Ruling of the lower court, and prevails 
upon this Court to affirm the Ruling and Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent requests that the decision of the lower court 
be affirmed in all respects, and that costs of this appeal be 
granted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this / ^ ^ day of July, 1985. 
^7C0KE & VINCENT 
lerson 
Attorney for Respondent 
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